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States and Russia are confirmed by
Alexei Arbatov, the veteran Russian analyst of American institutions and foreign policy. In his “Russian Security
and the Western Connection,” Arbatov
describes the destabilizing effect the
American abrogation of the ABM
Treaty would have upon Russia’s conventional forces. They would be degraded to the point where they would
be “hardly sufficient for even one local
contingency and several peacekeeping
operations.” Like Newhouse, Arbatov is
particularly critical of the present
American foreign policy, arguing that
the “quality and wisdom” of its design
is no longer commensurate with the financial and military power of the
United States.

current perceived U.S. penchant for a
triumphalist unilateralism, Delpech
would echo Aeschylus in Prometheus
Bound and envelop or constrain Pax
Americana with the bonds of
multilateralism.
I was struck by the book’s lack of a
comprehensive introduction or concluding chapter to sum up and assess
the future in a meaningful way. Instead,
the reader is left with several conclusions, which detracts from a sense of
cohesion about the book’s contents.
Nevertheless, each individual contribution has something of value to offer,
and taken in that context, each is significant to our understanding of the power
calculus at work today.
MYRON A. GREENBERG

Similarly, Ivan Safranchuk has presented an equally fascinating tour
d’horizon in his analysis of “An Array of
Threats to Russia.” Safranchuk effectively entombs the Cold War with the
argument that today Russia’s primary
strategic posture is defensive. This
point is demonstrated by his assertion
of Russian action. Surrounded by
pariah regimes such as exist in Iraq and
Iran and possessing the potential for
deploying weapons of mass destruction,
Russia, Safranchuk argues, now accepts
penetration of its Central Asian and
Caucasus borderlands by the United
States. This is a theme worth exploring.
Thérèse Delpech’s query with reference
to “A Safe and Secure Europe?” echoes
British foreign secretary Douglas
Hurd’s contrapuntal prediction of a decade ago of “a new disorder,” against
former President Bush’s proclamation
of a “New World Order.” Delpech portrays the “9/11” attacks as events
“which gave asymmetric warfare a horrific shape.” In order to “tame” the
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Defense Contract Management Agency, Dayton

O’Hanlon, Michael E. Defense Policy Choices
for the Bush Administration. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 244pp. $18.95

O’Hanlon presents his blueprint for
how U.S. resources should be spent
based on thorough strategic and military assessments. He recommends that
the Bush administration set priorities
and make the difficult choices. However, the terrorist attacks of “9/11” and
the completion of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have
changed fiscal conditions and defense
strategy.
O’Hanlon is a senior fellow in foreign
policy studies at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of numerous
books and articles on U.S. defense strategy, with special emphasis on defense
budgets and military technology. His
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comprehensive analysis and extensive
footnotes not only demonstrate his
deep knowledge of the subject but also
reinforce the complexity of strategic
and force planning decisions.
The book addresses “two major theaters
for war,” defense strategy, military
readiness and modernization, overseas
troop commitments, homeland defense,
national missile defense, offensive nuclear forces, and U.S. force planning
implications if the United States assists
Taiwan in defeating a hypothetical Chinese blockade. Each chapter describes
and assesses the strategic environment,
then offers comprehensive suggestions
for modifying the 2001–2005 resource
allocations.
A central theme throughout this work
is that the defense budget is unlikely to
make substantial gains and that the
Bush administration must balance
competing defense requirements. Even
with the large plus-up in the fiscal year
2002 defense budget, the military is still
fiscally constrained due to the demands
of the “procurement holiday” (the period after the Reagan administration’s
massive military buildup in which adequate funds were not provided to modernize existing weapons—without the
constant increase of new modern weapons, the need to replace old equipment
is exacerbated) and the war on terrorism. Overall, O’Hanlon believes in buying more existing weapons than
developing expensive next-generation
weapons. The author states that the
1997 QDR’s plan for modernization is
excessive. Rather than rush to transform most weapons, O’Hanlon recommends taking a patient, balanced
approach, such as buying less advanced
hardware for the large, main weapon
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systems while “aggressively modernizing electronics, munitions, sensors, and
communications systems,” giving a
higher priority to research and development and joint experimentation. For
example, he recommends that the Navy
cancel its variant of the Joint Strike
Fighter, purchase the 1997 QDRproposed quantity of F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet, and procure additional F/A18C/Ds to meet fighter aircraft force
structure requirements. O’Hanlon estimates this mixture of planes would
“save more than $5 billion over the next
decade.” Using the same philosophy,
O’Hanlon suggests that the Air Force
reduce the procurement quantity of
Joint Strike Fighters from 1,700 to five
hundred and purchase 1,200 more F-16
aircraft. The savings from these changes
could fund new technologies to make
the military more deployable and
lighter, as well as “small numbers of
next-generation major weaponry as ‘silver bullet’ forces.”
In another chapter, O’Hanlon recommends reducing the operational tempo
by dropping overseas troop commitments, stating that a service member is
“away from home at least 15–20% of
the time,” due mostly to deployments
and training. According to the author,
250,000 service members are either
based or deployed overseas. O’Hanlon
advocates maintaining a U.S. presence
in regions with key strategic interests
and scaling back in other regions. For
example, the number of Marines on
Okinawa should be reduced from
eighteen thousand to approximately
five thousand, because the deployment is
“not militarily or strategically essential—
and . . . is on balance harmful to the
U.S.-Japanese alliance.” As a substitute
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for personnel, he recommends positioning additional equipment on the
island in case of a regional crisis. Secondly, O’Hanlon proposes that the
Navy take another look at its full-time
presence in the Mediterranean. He believes that “NATO’s southern flank and
Israel’s western flank no longer constitute strategic vulnerabilities in the
post–Cold War era.” If a threat no longer exists, eliminate carrier deployments that are carried out only to
reassure allies and give “psychological
comfort.” Reducing unnecessary deployments, shifting bases closer to contested regions, and rotating crews to the
ship instead of returning the ship to
port will decrease the operational
tempo of the sailors, eliminate the need
for two carriers, and generate savings.
The recommendations made in this
work in early 2001 could have given the
Bush administration some policy options and provided alternatives for the
2001 QDR. However, many of
O’Hanlon’s arguments have been overtaken by world events. Nevertheless,
O’Hanlon’s exhaustive research and insightful analysis make this an interesting book for readers of strategy and
force-planning decision making.
CYNTHIA PERROTTI

Lieutenant Colonel
Naval War College

Khalilzad, Zalmay, et al. The United States and
Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001. 260pp.
$20

The United States and Asia presents a
cogent analysis of U.S. strategic planning in Asia, sweeping from Japan to
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Pakistan. The study’s specific focus is
development of policy options and recommendations, looking out at an approximate twenty-year horizon into the
future, especially analyzing and noting
implications for Air Force planning. A
result of Project AIR FORCE’S work on
future asian security, this book was prepared by a team of RAND specialists,
with the help of senior U.S. Air Force
leadership, and with editorial comment
by U.S. foreign policy officials. It benefits from the strengths of the team approach without the flaws of design by
committee. It succinctly presents the
thoughts and findings of the research
group in clear, thought-provoking
prose and figures.
The brief introduction stresses the need
to prevent latent rivalries in Asia from
upsetting the twenty years of relative
peace between 1980 and 2000. The
challenge for the United States is to develop policies that will continue to promote a stable Asia compatible with U.S.
interests—in short, to succeed in a
quest for “dynamic peace.”
The scene is set with a discussion of the
range of international trends and problems in Asia, including possible Korean
unification, the U.S.-Japan relationship,
China’s emerging profile, India’s ambitions, Pakistan’s difficulties, Russia’s future, disputes in the South China Sea,
stresses on Indonesia, and Vietnam’s
significance. Although necessarily a
whirlwind tour and not for country
specialists, these are short, basically fair
synopses. Additionally, the book includes four longer appendices by area
specialists that add considerable detail
to the earlier descriptions of changing
political-military environments in
Northeast Asia, China, Southeast Asia,
and South Asia.
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